A bill racing through the Senate is being advertised as a powerful bipartisan strike against Vladimir Putin.

But buried inside it, critics warn, is something potentially far more consequential:

A sweeping new tariff weapon for Donald Trump.

The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act has attracted 62 cosponsors, including 21 Democrats, and could soon reach the Senate floor. Its title presents the legislation as both a tribute to the late Republican senator and a forceful response to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

According to columnist Catherine Rampell, however, the bill may accomplish neither goal.

Instead, she argues, Congress is preparing to give Trump exactly what the courts previously denied him: explicit legal authority to impose enormous tariffs across a wide range of countries.

The bill is promoted as a sanctions measure, but Rampell notes that Trump already possesses broad authority to sanction Russia and those helping finance its war.

The problem is not that the president lacks power.

It is that he has chosen not to use all of it.

Trump could impose additional economic pressure on Moscow now, Rampell argues, but may be reluctant to provoke Putin. The proposed legislation does not solve that problem because it contains an exceptionally broad presidential waiver.

Under the measure, Trump could avoid imposing sanctions by certifying that doing so conflicts with the “national interests of the United States.”

Georgetown University law professor Jennifer Hillman described the provision as an “absolute waiver.”

In practice, she warned, it could give Trump extraordinary freedom to exempt virtually any person, industry or country from the sanctions regime.

That means the portion of the bill advertised as a punishment for Russia may ultimately depend on Trump voluntarily enforcing it.

The tariff provisions are a different story.

According to the analysis, the legislation would require the president to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on goods from at least 15 countries connected to Russian oil and gas purchases or sanctions evasion.

But the criteria used to identify and rank those countries are reportedly left dangerously vague.

That ambiguity is where the supposed Russia bill could become a geopolitical weapon.

Trump might use the authority against major purchasers of Russian energy. But Rampell warns that the language could also allow him to target countries such as Hungary and Slovakia—and potentially use their European Union membership to justify tariffs affecting the wider bloc.

Even Ukraine could theoretically find itself exposed, depending on how the administration interprets the categories and available trade data.

That possibility would turn the legislation’s stated purpose upside down.

A bill supposedly designed to help Ukraine resist Russia could become the legal foundation for tariffs against Ukraine or its European allies.

Trump’s earlier “Liberation Day” tariffs encountered major legal problems because courts found that the administration had exceeded the authority Congress had delegated.

This legislation could change that calculation.

If Congress explicitly authorizes the tariffs, future legal challenges would become considerably more difficult. Trump would no longer need to stretch an emergency statute to support his agenda. He could point directly to a bipartisan law.

That is why Rampell described the authority as a political and economic “nuke.”

Republican support is not difficult to understand.

The legislation carries Graham’s name, promises toughness against Russia and gives a Republican president another powerful instrument for reshaping global trade.

Rampell accused Trump’s Senate “toadies” of eagerly helping him secure that power.

The more surprising part is the Democratic support.

Twenty-one Democrats have signed onto the legislation, apparently attracted by its promise to punish Putin and strengthen Ukraine. Voting against a bill bearing sanctions against Russia could easily be portrayed as weakness toward the Kremlin.

But the emotional appeal of the title may be obscuring the economic power hidden in its provisions.

American consumers are already paying the price of existing tariffs. The Yale Budget Lab estimates that the average household bears approximately $1,100 annually in additional costs associated with current tariff policies.

Tariffs are formally charged to importers, not foreign governments. Those costs can then be passed along through higher prices, reduced wages, smaller profits or disrupted supply chains.

Nearly two dozen industry organizations have reportedly warned Senate leaders about the consequences of authorizing further increases.

A tariff approaching 100 percent could effectively double the import cost of targeted products before other expenses are added. It could also invite retaliation against American exporters, including farmers and manufacturers.

Democrats may believe they are voting for Ukraine.

If Rampell’s analysis is correct, they could instead be giving Trump a congressionally protected mechanism to escalate his trade wars—while allowing him to waive the sanctions that supposedly justify the bill.

That would leave Democrats politically trapped.

They would struggle to condemn Trump’s tariffs after helping authorize them. If prices rose, supply chains suffered or allies retaliated, Republicans could point to the legislation’s bipartisan list of sponsors.

Trump would wield the weapon.

Democrats would share responsibility for loading it.

The bill’s supporters may still argue that strong economic pressure is necessary to isolate Russia and deter countries from funding Putin’s war machine.

But before the Senate votes, lawmakers must answer a more uncomfortable question:

Are they sanctioning Russia—or handing Donald Trump a “nuke” that he can aim almost anywhere?