The warning was unmistakable.
If Iran cannot export its oil, then no one else in the region will be allowed to export theirs either.
That was the message delivered Wednesday by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of Iran’s Parliament and a central figure in the country’s war negotiations, as the conflict surrounding the Strait of Hormuz entered an even more dangerous phase.
“The equation of this war is clear: either all or none!” Ghalibaf wrote on X.
The threat placed one of the world’s most critical energy routes back at the center of the confrontation between Iran and the United States.
The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway separating Iran from Oman, carries roughly one-fifth of global petroleum shipments under normal conditions.
Its continued closure has already placed pressure on international oil markets.
Ghalibaf’s latest remarks suggested that Iran does not view the disruption as temporary.
“We have repeatedly said that the situation of the strait will not return to pre-war conditions,” he wrote.
He warned that as long as Iran’s security remained threatened and American forces stayed in the region, ships, ports and other infrastructure would remain vulnerable.
“If our security is not ensured, no infrastructure will be safe,” Ghalibaf said.
The statement represented more than battlefield rhetoric.
It amounted to an explicit threat against the economic stability of neighboring oil-producing states and countries around the world that depend on Gulf energy exports.
Iran’s strategy appears designed to transform the war from a direct military conflict into a global economic crisis.
The message to Washington and its allies is simple:
You may possess greater military power, but Iran possesses geography.
The Strait of Hormuz is only about 21 miles wide at its narrowest point. Shipping lanes used by commercial vessels are even smaller.
That makes the waterway vulnerable to mines, missiles, drones, fast attack boats and attacks on tankers.
Iran does not need to sink every ship to make the route commercially dangerous.
A handful of attacks can drive up insurance costs, discourage crews from entering the area and force companies to suspend operations.
The supplied report states that the strait has remained closed during the conflict.
If that continues, the economic consequences could spread rapidly.
Oil prices may rise.
Gasoline prices may increase.
Shipping expenses could climb.
Airlines and manufacturers may face higher fuel costs.
Countries dependent on imported energy could experience inflation, shortages and slowed economic growth.
The shock would not remain confined to the Middle East.
It would reach commuters, businesses and households thousands of miles away.
That gives Iran a form of leverage conventional military comparisons do not capture.
The United States can destroy Iranian facilities, command centers and weapons systems.
But it cannot easily move the Strait of Hormuz.
Nor can it guarantee that every tanker passing through will be protected against every possible attack.
Keeping the route open would require a sustained military presence and constant defensive operations.
That effort could consume ships, aircraft, interceptor missiles and personnel at a time when American forces are already under pressure across the region.
Ghalibaf’s threat also targeted Gulf states that have tried to maintain complicated relationships with both Washington and Tehran.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and other regional producers rely on secure export routes.
Some possess alternative pipelines that bypass the strait, but those routes do not fully replace its enormous capacity.
By warning “all or none,” Iran appeared to be telling those governments that neutrality would not protect them.
If Iranian exports remain blocked, their infrastructure could also become a target.
That could pressure regional leaders to distance themselves from the United States, limit military cooperation or push Washington toward negotiations.
It is coercion through shared vulnerability.
Iran cannot force the United States to withdraw directly.
It may be able to make the economic cost of remaining intolerable to American allies.
President Donald Trump responded with a threat of his own.
He warned Wednesday that the United States could target civilian areas, including a bridge or power plant near Tehran, if Iran carried out additional attacks on ships in the strait.
The statement marked another potentially serious escalation.
Bridges and power plants may serve military purposes, but they also support civilian life.
Striking them can disrupt transportation, electricity, hospitals, water systems and essential services.
International humanitarian law generally requires military forces to distinguish between civilian objects and legitimate military targets.
Dual-use infrastructure may be attacked only under specific conditions, including when it makes an effective contribution to military action and when expected civilian harm is not excessive compared with the anticipated military advantage.
Trump’s public phrasing did not provide that legal analysis.
Instead, it presented the facilities as retaliatory targets.
That distinction could matter.
Military attacks are not legally justified merely as punishment.
They must be connected to a legitimate military objective.
The administration may possess intelligence showing that particular bridges or power facilities support Iranian military operations.
But the supplied report does not include such evidence.
Trump’s warning therefore risks being interpreted as an open threat against civilians and the infrastructure they depend upon.
It may also strengthen Iran’s own propaganda.
Tehran can present the United States as deliberately targeting ordinary people while portraying its actions in the strait as defensive retaliation.
That narrative could increase public support for the Iranian government, even among citizens who previously opposed its leadership.
The administration appears to believe that attacking economic and logistical systems will weaken Iran’s ability and willingness to continue the war.
But the opposite outcome is possible.
External attacks can unify divided populations.
They can make negotiation politically impossible.
They can convince leaders that retreat would invite further humiliation.
That is the danger of escalation built around reciprocal threats.
Iran attacks ships.
Trump threatens infrastructure.
Iran threatens regional oil exports.
The United States launches more strikes.
Each side claims the other created the need for retaliation.
The conflict then expands without either side admitting it has chosen expansion.
Ghalibaf’s declaration also challenged Trump’s repeated claim that Iran is desperate to negotiate.
A government preparing to surrender would not normally threaten to close the region’s oil routes indefinitely.
The threat may be a bluff intended to improve Iran’s bargaining position.
It may also reflect a genuine strategy to endure military damage while spreading economic pain.
Either way, it suggests Tehran does not yet believe Washington has forced it into submission.
Iran may be calculating that time favors it.
The longer the strait remains unsafe, the more international pressure will build on the United States to end the war.
Countries that initially supported efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program may become less supportive when energy costs surge.
European and Asian governments may push harder for diplomacy.
American voters may turn against the conflict as gasoline prices rise.
Regional allies may restrict cooperation.
Iran can absorb severe military damage and still gain leverage if the political coalition against it begins to fracture.
That is why the Strait of Hormuz has been described as a lifeline for global oil.
It is not simply a passage between two coastlines.
It is a strategic pressure point connecting local conflict to the entire international economy.
Every threat to the strait is also a threat to markets, supply chains and political stability.
Ghalibaf made clear that Iran intends to use that leverage.
His message did not promise restoration.
It promised permanent insecurity until Tehran’s demands are met.
That raises a difficult question for Trump.
Can the United States force the strait open without becoming trapped in a prolonged naval war?
Escorting commercial ships may reduce the risk but cannot eliminate it.
Removing mines requires time and specialized equipment.
Striking Iranian missile sites may trigger attacks from new locations.
Destroying boats and launchers may provoke proxy forces to target other waterways.
The Houthis could intensify attacks near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, placing pressure on a second major shipping route.
The conflict could then stretch from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.
Such an expansion would create precisely the economic pain Iran is threatening.
Trump has repeatedly promised that American power will produce rapid, decisive outcomes.
But control of maritime chokepoints is not achieved through declarations alone.
It requires sustained security, regional cooperation and a political settlement that reduces the incentive for continued attacks.
The administration has not yet demonstrated how its current strategy will produce those conditions.
Instead, both sides are issuing increasingly severe threats.
Iran says no country will export oil safely if its own exports are blocked.
Trump says civilian infrastructure may be struck if more ships are attacked.
The danger is no longer only that one threat will be carried out.
It is that both will be.
If Iran intensifies attacks and the United States retaliates against infrastructure near Tehran, the war could move into a new and far more destructive phase.
Oil markets would likely react immediately.
Regional governments could be pulled deeper into the conflict.
Civilian suffering could increase.
And the possibility of a negotiated exit would become even more remote.
“All or none” is not the language of compromise.
It is the language of mutual economic destruction.
Iran is betting that the world cannot tolerate prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.
Trump is betting that military pressure will force Tehran to retreat before the economic damage becomes politically unbearable.
Only one of those calculations can succeed.
The rest of the world may pay the price while they find out.
